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Abstract 
There exist several statistically-based exchange rate regime classifications that disagree with 
one another to a disappointing degree. To what extent is this a matter of the quality of the 
design of these schemes, and to what extent does it reflect the need to supplement statistics 
with other information (as is done in the IMF’s de facto classification)?  It is shown that 
statistical methods are good at the basics (distinguishing some type of peg from some type of 
float), but less helpful in other respects, such as determining whether a float is managed, 
particularly for countries that are not very remote from their main trading partners.  Different 
measures of exchange rate volatility have been used but are not primarily responsible for 
differences between classifications.  The theoretical underpinning of particular classification 
schemes needs to be more explicit. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accurate identification of the exchange rate regime is important for many reasons.  It is 
required to implement proper empirical tests of theoretical hypotheses, such as the effect of the 
exchange rate regime on macroeconomic and trade outcomes, or whether the “impossible 
trinity” holds.  Alberola et al. (2016), Erdem and Özmen (2015), Lin and Chu (2013) and 
Martin (2016) are some recent examples of the routine use of “off-the-shelf” regime 
classifications in empirical work. 
Historically, dissatisfaction with the truth of countries’ declared exchange rate regimes 
led to the development of a variety of alternative classification systems, termed de facto 
because they relied to a greater or lesser degree on statistical data (see Klein and Shambaugh 
(2010), Rose (2011) and Tavlas et al. (2008) for detailed surveys).  Since 1999 even the IMF 
has used its own judgement in classifying countries’ regimes rather than merely recording what 
countries claim it to be. 
Comparison of the outcomes of these alternative classification systems has revealed 
that they fail to agree with each other to a disturbing extent (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007; 
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia, 2013; Frankel and Wei, 2008; Tavlas et al., 2008).  For example 
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2013), using three regime categories (hard pegs, soft pegs and 
floats), find pairwise agreement rates between three schemes over the period 1980-2004 of 
60%, 69% and 75%.  They also find that disagreements are less common in the advanced 
countries. 
A comparison of outcomes is useful: if all schemes were found to agree closely with 
one another, then the classifications would look highly robust to differences in the detail of the 
statistical design.  When, as in this case, schemes disagree, it is important to understand how 
different design features contribute to this result, and to consider how these design features 
relate to the theoretical analysis of exchange rate regimes (for example, whether the main issue 
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is the exchange rate as a shock-absorber or as a nominal anchor), in order to decide which 
classification is most suitable.  The present article is motivated by a perception that there is a 
significant gap in the literature here.  After a discussion of theoretical issues, there follows a 
forensic analysis of the differences between alternative classifications, which is necessarily 
somewhat technical.  This highlights the differences between the statistics used, the treatment 
of occasional realignments and the choice of statistical thresholds that function as regime 
boundaries.   The remainder of the article discusses what exactly a purely statistical approach 
can and cannot be expected to achieve. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section Two discusses theoretical issues.  
In Section Three, different de facto classification schemes are described and compared. In 
Section Four, the empirical differences between these classification schemes are analysed.   
Section Five discusses whether these differences are largely statistical or conceptual.  Section 
Six summarises what a purely statistical analysis can and cannot do, or in other words where it 
needs to be supplemented by other information.  Section Seven concludes. 
 
2. THEORETICAL ISSUES 
The traditional view of a currency peg is that it is a device that prevents the exchange rate from 
adjusting freely in response to market forces (e.g. Friedman, 1953).  If we adopt this point of 
view, then a peg may be anchored to either a single currency or a basket of currencies, and the 
central rate may either be stationary or may crawl to reflect inflation differentials.  In all of 
these cases, what is important is that the exchange rate follows a predetermined path with only 
minor deviations, and the crucial feature of a peg is low volatility relative to the central rate.  
An alternative approach that has developed in the wake of the rational expectations 
revolution is to view a pegged exchange rate as a device for committing the authorities to low 
inflation (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988).  Since devaluation would represent a departure from 
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that commitment, this view would regard the distinction between pegs with devaluations and 
those without as of critical importance.  This point is usually acknowledged as a distinction 
between “hard” pegs, with stronger than the usual institutional obstacles to devaluation, such 
as a currency board system or a currency union, and conventional pegs, rather than as one 
between pegs and non-pegs. 
This view of the exchange rate as a potential nominal anchor would also treat crawling 
pegs as something rather different from horizontal pegs, since crawling pegs effectively target 
the real rather than the nominal exchange rate.  A basket peg (especially if unannounced) might 
be regarded as a rather weak nominal anchor, because of its relative lack of transparency.  In 
short, the “nominal-anchor” approach would place more emphasis on distinguishing different 
types of peg than the volatility approach. 
A third approach derives from “the impossible trinity” of a pegged exchange rate, 
uncontrolled international capital movements and monetary independence (e.g. Bleaney et al., 
2013; Mandilaras, 2015).  With free flows of capital and a commitment to the future path of 
the exchange rate, interest rates are tied to foreign rates by international arbitrage opportunities. 
In the case of a horizontal single-currency peg, interest rates must be equal to those in the 
anchor currency (plus any allowance for expected devaluation); in the case of a crawling peg, 
the rate of crawl has to be added as well. For basket pegs the relevant foreign interest rate is a 
weighted average of several currencies.  This approach stresses that freedom of capital flows 
plus monetary independence inevitably imply exchange rate volatility. 
It is usual to distinguish between about eight to twelve exchange rate regimes, including 
the various types of peg mentioned above plus free floats and managed floats.  Since some of 
these regimes are thinly populated, it is common in empirical work to aggregate this “fine” 
classification into a “coarse” classification of two extremes and an intermediate category, the 
precise definitions depending on the investigator’s purpose. 
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In the remainder of this paper we ask how much can realistically be expected of a purely 
statistical approach to regime classification.  One issue is to identify the right statistic to use.  
We show that the particular choice of statistic is not the main reason why classifications 
disagree; rather the critical points are conceptual, such as where to draw the boundary between 
a peg and a float, and how to treat occasional devaluations. 
 
3. EXCHANGE RATE CLASSIFICATIONS 
Tavlas et al. (2008) refer to more than ten de facto classification schemes that have been 
suggested, but quite a few of them have rather limited time or country coverage.  We focus on 
a few schemes that are based exclusively on exchange rate behaviour, and do not take into 
account other forms of intervention such as movements in foreign exchange reserves (as do 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). The motivation for adding other variables comes from 
the literature on currency crises, where the intensity of speculative pressure is a variable of 
interest.  In this case we are not interested in measuring such speculative pressure, but rather 
in capturing how it is reflected in the exchange rate, irrespective of any other policy measures, 
so it seems preferable to confine the analysis to exchange rate movements.1 
The primary criterion for inclusion is data availability, since in the next section we wish 
to compare the classifications over a large sample of observations; all the classifications used 
here cover forty years of data for practically every country in the world.  The IMF classification 
is omitted because the system has changed at various times, as summarized in Klein and 
Shambaugh (2010, Table 3.1).2  In this section we summarise the differences between the 
                                                            
1 An additional point made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is that not all foreign exchange reserve movements 
reflect speculative pressures.  It is certainly true that floating exchange rates are more volatile at certain 
periods than at others, which one might ascribe to the intensity of shocks, but the disappointing results of 
exchange rate models suggest that to model such shocks would be a difficult task. 
2 In addition the IMF de facto classification relies on the judgement of officials and is not based purely on a 
statistical algorithm, which puts it in a somewhat different category. 
5 
 
schemes (for a more detailed and technical discussion see the Appendix).  The three schemes 
that we focus on are those of Shambaugh (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Bleaney and 
Tian (2017). 
The scheme of Shambaugh (2004) [hereafter termed JS] identifies a country’s regime 
as either a peg or a non-peg in each calendar year.  A reference currency is identified.  For a 
peg, the range of the log of the exchange rate against the reference currency must not exceed 
0.04 over the calendar year. The one exception is that one exchange rate realignment is allowed, 
on condition that the log of the exchange rate is unchanged in eleven months out of twelve.  
Thus effectively the level of the exchange rate is allowed to vary by ±2%, or alternatively by a 
realignment of any size in one month and 0% in the remaining eleven months, for a peg to be 
coded.  
The scheme of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) [hereafter termed RR] is not easily 
summarised briefly, but it focuses on the tails of the distribution of monthly exchange rate 
changes against a reference currency.  Essentially, for a peg, 80% of these observations must 
fall within the range ±0.01. If this criterion is not met, but more than 80% of observations fall 
within the range ±0.02, the regime is classified as a band. 
The scheme of Bleaney and Tian (2017) [hereafter termed BT] presents a flexibility 
index based on the root mean square residual (RMSE) from a regression of the change in the 
log of the exchange rate against a chosen numéraire currency on the change in the log of the 
US dollar and of the euro against the same numéraire currency.  This regression was originally 
suggested by Frankel and Wei (1995) for identifying basket pegs.  If there is evidence of a 
realignment in a given month, the regression is augmented by a dummy for that month and the 
index recalculated.  A threshold value of the flexibility index needs to be chosen in order to 
define the boundary between pegs and floats; in what follows we use 0.01 as the threshold.  
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The residuals are effectively the movement in the exchange rate relative to the estimated central 
rate, which is determined by the regression.3 
These schemes differ in the three crucial aspects of the statistic used to measure 
volatility, the thresholds between regimes and the treatment of realignments.  Realignments 
can be ignored in the RR scheme, since they are usually too infrequent to make much difference 
to the proportion of “large” exchange rate movements observed in any period.  In BT and JS 
realignments need to be identified and taken into account; in JS the rules for a peg change if 
there is a realignment, whereas in BT they do not.  In relation to statistical matters, the JS 
scheme uses a measure of the range of variation of the level of the exchange rate, whereas RR 
and BT look at exchange rate movements.  BT’s statistic is effectively a measure of the average 
absolute monthly change, whereas RR focus on the frequency of large movements.  Since the 
statistics are different, it is impossible to compare thresholds in the abstract. 
 
4. COMPARISON OF OUTCOMES 
In this section we compare the proportion of pegs identified by each scheme. For the Reinhart-
Rogoff scheme the fine classification permits the use of two alternative definitions of a peg, 
depending on whether the frequency of large exchange rate movements is based on a ±2% or 
a ±1% threshold, which we label respectively RR2 and RR1.4   
Figure 1 shows the proportion of pegs for each year from 1971 onwards for BT, JS, 
RR1 and RR2.5  The JS and the RR1 schemes always identify many fewer pegs than the other 
                                                            
3 See Bleaney and Tian (2017) for examples. 
4 The fine classification categories are listed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, p. 25).  We omit categories 14 and 
15.  RR1 defines as pegs only those categories described as pegs (1, 2, 4, 5 and 7); RR2 also includes those 
described as “within a band not greater than ±2%“ (3, 6, 8 and 11).  It is important to be clear that this is loose 
terminology: RR use data on exchange rate changes, not the range covered by the level. 
5 For a list of countries covered, see Appendix 
7 
 
two (51.0% overall for JS; 57.4% for RR1).  The other two classifications agree on the overall 
frequency of pegs (77.1% for BT; 76.9% for RR2), but disagree about the trend, with BT 
showing a continuous downward trend but RR2 showing some recovery during the 1990s (as 
does R1). 
 Figure 2 shows the agreement rate for each pair of schemes in each year (the percentage 
of observations on which the schemes agree).  The JS/RR2 pair has a relatively low agreement 
rate, averaging 67.1%.  The BT/JS agreement rate was around 70% from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1990s, since when it has been on an increasing trend, reaching over 80% in the last few 
years.  The BT/RR2 agreement rate has been fairly constant at around 80%.  By contrast to 
RR2, RR1 agrees fairly closely with JS up to 1990, after which it identifies some recovery in 
the proportion of pegs to about 60%. 
 There are identifiable reasons for these results (for example the JS scheme excludes 
most basket pegs, crawling pegs and horizontal pegs in devaluation years if there is any 
variation at all about the central rate, whereas the BT scheme would tend to include them as 
pegs), but an interesting question is whether the precise statistic used to measure exchange rate 
volatility makes much difference.6  This is the question that we address in the next Section. 
  
                                                            
 Table A2. 
6 We have experimented with applying a JS rule of zero variation in the event of a realignment in the BT 
system;  it switches about 10 percent of the observations from pegs to floats. 
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Figure 1. Percentages of pegs identified by year (JS, RR1, RR2, BT) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Pairwise agreement rates by year (BT, JS, RR1, RR2) 
 
9 
 
5. COMPARING ALTERNATIVE STATISTICS 
In this Section we generate alternative statistics based on the residuals from a regression similar 
to that of Bleaney and Tian (2017).    The point of this exercise is that the difference between 
these measures is purely statistical; the treatment of realignments and the method for estimating 
the central rate are identical, so important conceptual differences have been eliminated.  If the 
different statistical measures produce very much the same results, then we will know that it is 
conceptual differences that underlie the relatively low agreement rates shown in Figure Two.  
If, on the other hand, alternative statistics turn out to be poorly correlated, then it would be 
clear that the statistical issues are important. 
One statistic is a measure of the range of variation of the level of the exchange rate 
relative to the estimated central rate; this statistic is the equivalent of that used by Shambaugh 
(2004).  The other statistic is the root mean square error of the regression, as in Bleaney and 
Tian (2017), and reflects the typical size of monthly changes in the exchange rate, again relative 
to the estimated central rate.7 
The statistics are based on a regression identical to that of Bleaney and Tian (2017), 
except that we extend the period from twelve to 24 months.  This is because with twelve-month 
windows there is a maximum of only nine degrees of freedom (and only eight if a realignment 
is identified), which is rather a small number from which to generate accurate statistics.  The 
baseline regression is: 
 
∆ln𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏∆ ln𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡       (1)                              
 
                                                            
7 A statistic analogous to that used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) would be a measure of the frequency of 
large absolute residuals. We have examined such a statistic, but since the number of “large” residuals has to 
be an integer, it is hard to calibrate it finely enough to give a distribution of outcomes that is similar to that of 
the other statistics; consequently we omit it from the analysis. 
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where 𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) is the number of units of currency i per Swiss franc (USD = US dollar; EUR 
= euro).8 For some currencies other potential anchor currencies are added to the equation.9  The 
statistic is based on the residuals from equation (1).  Realignments are dealt with in a similar 
way to Bleaney and Tian (2017). 
For year T, we use monthly data from January of year T–1 to December of year T.  In 
the case of a peg, the residuals from such a regression can be interpreted as movements in the 
exchange rate relative to the central rate. The root mean square error (RMSE) is the statistic 
analogous to that used by BT. If the residuals are cumulated, the difference between the 
maximum cumulated residual and the minimum cumulated residual provides an estimate of 
how much the level of the exchange rate has varied relative to the central rate.  We call this 
statistic the RANGE statistic.  In the special case of a single-currency horizontal peg with no 
realignments, it is identical to the statistic used by Shambaugh (2004).10  Appendix Table A1 
summarizes the algorithms for these classification schemes. 
One approach is simply to compare the two statistics across the entire sample.  Table 1 
shows some summary statistics for each.  Both have a long upper tail, and are highly positively 
skewed to the left, with a mean that is higher than the 75th percentile and at least three times 
higher than the median. This is because for many pegs the statistic is close to zero, and cannot 
be non-negative.  The correlation between the RMSE and the RANGE statistics is only 0.350, 
but that is strongly affected by outliers at the upper end; the rank correlation is much higher at 
0.845. 
                                                            
8 Alternative numeraire currencies to the Swiss franc may be used; see the discussion in Bleaney and Tian 
(2017). 
9 For details see Bleaney and Tian (2017). 
10 A statistic analogous to that used by RR would be based on the proportion of residuals outside a certain 
range. 
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An alternative approach to comparing the statistics is to define a threshold that separates 
pegs from floats for each, and then to calculate how much they agree.  To generate a fair 
measure of the extent of disagreement, we need the two thresholds to yield approximately the 
same proportion of pegs.11  By experimentation we have established that: a RANGE of 0.04 is 
roughly equivalent to an RMSE of 0.01; a RANGE of 0.03 is roughly equivalent to an RMSE 
of 0.008; and a RANGE of 0.02 is roughly equivalent to an RMSE of 0.006.  A threshold for 
RANGE of 0.04, which is also that used by Shambaugh (2004), corresponds directly to a target 
zone of ±2%, and a threshold of 0.02 corresponds to a target zone of ±1%.  We label the 
classifications thus generated respectively RANGE-4, RMSE-1, RANGE-3, RMSE-0.8, 
RANGE-2 and RMSE-0.6. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of pegs identified in the whole sample by the RANGE 
and RMSE statistics and the agreement rate between them, which exceeds 90% in each case.  
This is much higher than the agreement rates in Figure 2, and suggests that the majority of 
disagreements between classifications arise from conceptual rather than statistical differences.   
The high level of agreement implies that it is not critical whether the statistic used is based on 
the range of the level of the exchange rate or on the volatility of exchange rate movements. 
  
                                                            
11 If  the proportion of pegs for the two statistics is respectively p and q, the disagreement rate cannot be less 
than |p-q|. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for RMSE and RANGE 
 
 RMSE Range 
Mean 0.014 0.078 
St. Dev. 0.038 0.419 
Skewness 7.721 47.411 
Median 0 004 0 015 
75th Percentile  0.013 0 058 
90th Percentile 0.030 0.145 
No. Obs. 6923 
Correlation 0.3500 
Spearman's Rank Correlation 0.8454 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Comparing classifications based on RANGE and RMSE 
 
 Percentage of pegs  
Classification pair RANGE RMSE Agreement rate (%) 
    
RANGE-4, RMSE-1 77.4 75.1 91.7 
RANGE-3, RMSE-0.8 72.6 71.4 92.2 
RANGE-2, RMSE-0.6 66.7 66.8 93.0 
Note.  Sample size: 7148 observations. 
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6. WHAT STATISTICAL METHODS CAN AND CANNOT ACHIEVE 
A typical fine classification scheme would want to identify the following regimes: a currency 
board; a horizontal peg; a horizontal band (greater variation than a peg); a basket peg; a basket 
band; a crawling peg; a crawling band; a managed float; and a free float.  Can this be 
successfully achieved by statistical methods alone?  The statistical approach of Shambaugh 
(2004) and of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) assumes that pegs are to a single currency, and that 
basket pegs can be ignored as rare, which may be true historically but cannot be guaranteed to 
be so in future.  In the regression method of Bleaney and Tian (2017), the estimated coefficients 
provide information that can be used to distinguish different types of peg.  A horizontal peg 
should have a coefficient of one for the anchor currency, and zero for the intercept and any 
other currency.  A crawling peg to a single currency should be similar except for a non-zero 
intercept.  In a basket peg, the currency coefficients should lie between zero and one and should 
add up to one (provided that all the currencies in the basket appear in the regression).  
Thresholds for the RMSE need to be decided for pegs to be distinguished from bands, and 
bands from floats.  What statistical methods cannot do is to distinguish a currency board from 
a conventional peg that happens not to have been devalued for a long time; that requires 
additional information. 
  When it comes to floats, it is important to recognise that bilateral exchange rate 
volatility increases with distance, and that at the aggregate level both nominal and real effective 
exchange rate volatility increase with remoteness (weighted-average distance from trading 
partners) (Bleaney and Tian, 2012; Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni, 2006). Consequently the 
natural level of volatility under free floating is lower for less remote currencies.  When Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) calibrate the “typical” behaviour of freely floating currencies from the 
statistics for the currencies of Australia, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and the United 
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Kingdom against the US dollar, and then use this to derive a threshold between managed and 
free floats, they fail to take account of the fact that these are all widely separated currency pairs. 
Consequently they end up virtually never classifying less remote floaters like Canada and the 
UK, which are relatively close to a major trading partner (the USA and the Euro Area 
respectively), as free floats.  In other words, the threshold chosen by Reinhart and Rogoff is 
appropriate only for more remote currencies, because a volatility statistic that would seem to 
indicate a managed float for a more remote currency may be entirely typical of free floating for 
a less remote one. 
Table 3 illustrates the point.  The average statistic (either RANGE or RMSE) for more 
remote floating currencies in Table 3 is significantly higher than for the less remote ones, with 
the t-statistic of the average difference exceeding six.  That implies that any purely statistical 
method of distinguishing managed from free floats should take remoteness into account, 
although exactly how is not entirely clear.  One might prefer instead to rely on other 
information, as is done in the IMF’s de facto classification. 
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Table 3. Statistics for more remote and less remote floating currencies 1997-2011 
 RANGE RMSE 
country mean std deviation mean std deviation 
 less remote 
Canada 0.0783 0.0337 0.0206 0.0071 
Norway 0.0658 0.0446 0.0166 0.0058 
Sweden 0.0591 0.0254 0.0153 0.0061 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0659 0.0393 0.0171 0.0055 
     
 more remote 
Australia 0.0903 0.0425 0.0242 0.0044 
Chile 0.0970 0.0570 0.0261 0.0073 
Japan 0.0940 0.0334 0.0246 0.0079 
New Zealand 0.1020 0.0498 0.0275 0.0059 
     
Difference in 
means 
(t-statistic) 
0.0285 
(6.57) 
 0.00822 
(6.46) 
 
Notes.  For description of statistics see text.  The difference in means is between the more 
remote and the less remote countries. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Even though de facto exchange rate classification schemes have been in use for some years, 
they show little sign of converging towards agreement with one another.  Existing schemes 
differ in the statistic used to measure exchange rate volatility, the threshold values of this 
statistic that form the boundaries between regimes, and how realignments are treated.  
Nevertheless statistical methods can go a long way towards identifying an exchange rate 
regime.  For example, independent floats have clearly different characteristics from pegs.  
Using the regression method, basket pegs and crawls can be picked up. 
We have shown that, with similarly calibrated thresholds and differences in conceptual 
approaches as far as possible ironed out, different statistics produce similar results, with over 
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90 percent agreement.  That implies that economic rather than statistical issues are mainly 
responsible for the observed disagreements between schemes, and users need to be more 
conscious of the economic assumptions underlying a given scheme.  With a better 
understanding of these issues, researchers would be in a better position to choose a 
classification that best suits their purposes. 
Nevertheless statistical methods have some clear limitations, where they need to be 
supplemented with other information or judgement.  A currency board is not statistically 
distinguishable from a long-running conventional peg with no history of realignments just 
using exchange rate data.  Tightly managed floats may be hard to distinguish from some sort 
of target zone with a wider band than that of a normal peg, and loosely managed ones may be 
hard to distinguish from free floats.  This issue is particularly acute for countries that are not 
very remote from their trading partners because, as we have shown, these countries have 
intrinsically lower exchange rate volatility than others.   
 
References 
Alberola, E., A. Erce and J.M. Serena (2016), International reserves and gross capital flows 
dynamics, Journal of International Money and Finance 60, 151-171 
Bénassy-Quéré, A., B. Coeuré and V. Mignon (2006), On the identification of de facto currency 
pegs, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 20, 112-127 
Bleaney, M.F. and M. Francisco (2007), Classifying exchange rate regimes: a statistical 
analysis of alternative methods, Economics Bulletin 6 (3), 1-6. 
Bleaney, M.F., H.A. Lee and T. Lloyd (2013), Testing the trilemma: exchange rate 
regimes, capital mobility and monetary independence, Oxford Economic Papers 65, 
876-897 
 
Bleaney, M.F. and M. Tian (2012), Currency networks, bilateral exchange rate volatility and 
the role of the US dollar, Open Economies Review 23 (5), 785-803 
Bleaney, M.F. and M. Tian (2017), Measuring exchange rate flexibility by regression methods, 
Oxford Economic Papers, forthcoming 
17 
 
Bleaney, M.F., M. Tian and L. Yin (2016), Global trends in the choice of exchange 
rate regime, Open Economies Review 26, 71-85 
 
Bravo-Ortega, C. and J. di Giovanni (2006), Remoteness and real exchange rate volatility, 
IMF Staff Papers 53 (Special Issue), 115-132 
 
Eichengreen, B. and R. Razo-Garcia (2013), How reliable are de facto exchange rate regime 
classifications? International Journal of Finance and Economics 18, 216-239 
Erdem, F.P.and E. Özmen (2015), Exchange rate regimes and business cycles: an empirical 
Investigation, Open Economies Review 26(5), 1041-1058 
Frankel, J. and S.-J. Wei (1995), Emerging currency blocs, in The International Monetary 
System: Its Institutions and its Future, ed. H. Genberg (Berlin, Springer) 
Frankel, J. and S.-J. Wei (2008), Estimation of de facto exchange rate regimes: synthesis of the 
techniques for inferring flexibility and basket weights, IMF Staff Papers 55 (3), 384-416 
Ghosh, A.R., A.-M. Gulde and H.C. Wolf (2002), Exchange Rate Regimes: Causes and 
Consequences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1988) The advantage of tying one’s hands, European Economic 
Review 32, 1055-1082 
Klein, M.W. and J.C. Shambaugh (2010), Exchange Rate Regimes in the Modern Era, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Levy-Yeyati, E. and F. Sturzenegger (2005), Classifying exchange rate regimes: deeds versus 
words, European Economic Review 49 (6), 1173-1193 
Lin, H.-Y. and H.-P. Chu (2013), Are fiscal deficits inflationary? Journal of International 
Money and Finance 32, 214-233 
Mandilaras, A. (2015), The international policy trilemma in the post-Bretton Woods era, 
Journal of Macroeconomics 44, 18-32 
Martin, F.E. (2016), Exchange rate regimes and current account adjustment: an empirical 
investigation, Journal of International Money and Finance 65, 69-93 
Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K. (2004), The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a 
re-interpretation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1), 1-48 
Rose, A.K. (2011), Exchange rate regimes in the modern era: fixed, floating and flaky, Journal 
of Economic Literature 49 (3), 652-672 
Shambaugh, J. (2004), The effects of fixed exchange rates on monetary policy, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 119 (1), 301-352 
Tavlas, G., H. Dellas and A.C. Stockman (2008), The classification and performance of 
alternative exchange-rate systems, European Economic Review 52, 941-963 
18 
 
 
 
APPENDIX – DETAILED COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES 
In this Appendix we summarise and evaluate a number of classification schemes that are 
exclusively based on exchange rate data. 
Ghosh et al. (2002) [hereafter GGW]. A set of annual scores (s) is constructed based on the 
mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of monthly rates of exchange rate depreciation against 
each of a number of reference currencies; the minimum of these values of s identifies the one 
to which the currency is potentially pegged, and all the above-minimum values are discarded.  
Specifically the statistic is: 
 𝑠𝑠 = �𝜇𝜇2 + 𝜎𝜎2 
Countries’ regimes are recorded as pegged, intermediate or floating based on whether this 
statistic is low, intermediate or high. The distribution of regimes is recorded, and the thresholds 
for s in each year are chosen so as to yield exactly the same distribution as in the IMF de jure 
classification in that year. 
Evaluation: a horizontal single-currency peg should yield a low value of s, as intended, but a 
realignment during the year would raise both µ2 and σ2, in which case a realignment year might 
be classified as intermediate or even floating.  Basket pegs and crawling pegs will also tend to 
have higher values of s than single-currency pegs. The use of different thresholds in different 
years is unsatisfactory, as is the choice of the de jure classification as the basis for determining 
them, since the main point of a de facto classification is to establish if the de jure classification 
is correct. 
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Shambaugh (2004) [hereafter termed JS].  A reference currency is identified.  If the maximum 
and minimum of the log of the exchange rate against the reference currency (the US dollar 
being the default) do not differ by more than 0.04 over the calendar year, that observation is a 
peg.  Alternatively, if the 0.04 threshold is exceeded, the observation is still a peg if the log of 
the exchange rate is unchanged in eleven months out of twelve.  Thus effectively the level of 
the exchange rate is allowed to vary by ±2%, or alternatively by a realignment of any size in 
one month and 0% in the remaining eleven months, for a peg to be coded.  
Evaluation:  the statistical criterion is the range of variation about the central rate, which has 
the merit that it is closely related to the width of the target zone. There is the same problem 
with basket pegs and crawling pegs as in the case of Ghosh et al. (2002).  The switch to a zero 
range in the event of a realignment implies that many pegs may not be identified as such in 
realignment years.  For these reasons the frequency of pegs is likely to be underestimated. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) [hereafter termed RR].  Movements of the log of the exchange rate 
against various reference currencies are analysed, and as in GGW the reference currency that 
yields the lowest volatility is used. Where available, the exchange rate in the parallel market 
rather than the official rate is used. If, over a five-year period from years T–4 to T, more than 
80% of monthly changes in the log of the exchange rate against any of the reference currencies 
fall within the range ±0.01, the exchange rate regime in all of the years T–4 to T is classified 
as some form of peg. Alternatively, even if this criterion is not met, if the change in the 
exchange rate is zero for four months or more, it is classified as a peg for those months. If fewer 
than 80% of monthly changes fall within the range ±0.01, but more than 80% fall within the 
range ±0.02, the regime is classified as a band.  If the exchange rate moves by more than 40% 
in a year, that observation is placed in a separate “freely falling” category (these observations 
are omitted from the comparison with other schemes).  Thus the scheme focuses on the upper 
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tail of the distribution of monthly exchange rate movements, and specifically the proportion 
that exceed either 1% or 2% in absolute value. 
Evaluation: The statistic used represents the general idea that exchange rate volatility is lower 
under pegs and therefore that there are fewer large movements, and its relationship to the width 
of a target zone is unclear since it concerns the frequency distribution of exchange rate changes 
rather than a range for the level.  Basket pegs may well not meet the criteria for a peg, but 
crawling pegs should do so if the crawl is slow enough.12  Realignments, if not too frequent, 
should not cause any particular problem, since they represent just another tail observation.  The 
proportion of pegs recorded will depend entirely on the threshold chosen for the statistic. 
Bleaney and Tian (2017) [hereafter termed BT].   The scheme is based on the root mean square 
residual (RMSE) from a regression similar to that of Frankel and Wei (1995) for identifying 
basket pegs.  For each calendar year, the change in the log of the official exchange rate against 
the Swiss franc (the chosen numéraire currency) is regressed on the change in the log of the 
US dollar and of the euro against the Swiss franc.  Occasionally, other reference currencies are 
added.13  If the RMSE from this regression is less than 0.01, that country-year observation is 
coded a peg.  If the RMSE is greater than 0.01, twelve new regressions are estimated each 
including a dummy variable for a particular month as a test for a realignment.  If the F-statistic 
for the most significant of these dummy variables (April, say) is less than 30, the regime is 
coded a float.  If the F-statistic for April is greater than 30, and the RMSE is less than 0.01, the 
observation is coded a peg with a realignment; otherwise it is a float.   
                                                            
12 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, pp. 42-3) claim that missing a few de facto basket pegs is historically “almost 
certainly not a major issue”.  Whether or not this is true of the past, it might not be true in the future, as 
illustrated, for example, by China’s announced shift from a US dollar peg to a basket peg in December 2015. 
13 See Bleaney and Tian (2016) for details. A similar regression approach to regime classification has been 
suggested by Benassy-Quéré et al. (2006) and Frankel and Wei (2008), but they focus on the estimated 
coefficients rather than the  goodness of fit. 
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Evaluation: the regression approach should cater for basket pegs (through the regression 
coefficients) or crawls (through the intercept), but errors may arise from the small number of 
degrees of freedom in each regression.  The use of dummy variables solves the problem of 
realignments, provided that there is not more than one per year.  The statistic used is different 
from that of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), since it captures the average size of movements in 
the exchange rate rather than the proportion of large ones, but as in their case the statistic is not 
closely related to the width of the target zone. 
Summary: the Shambaugh system comes closest to the notion of a peg as a narrow target zone 
for the exchange rate, but underestimates the proportion of pegs for various reasons.  The other 
three systems use statistics which capture the general idea that pegs have lower volatility, but 
whose relationship to the width of the target zone is unclear. 
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Appendix Table A1. Algorithms for a binary classification using RANGE and RMSE 
Scheme Description of algorithm for regime classification in year T 
RANGE-4 Regress monthly change in ln exchange rate against Swiss franc on change 
in ln US$ and euro rates against Swiss franc for January of year T-1 to 
December of year T.  Repeat procedure 24 times, each with one monthly 
dummy added.  If maximum F-statistic for addition of any monthly dummy 
> 30, use that regression in place of the original. Cumulate the residuals from 
the chosen regression and calculate the difference between the maximum and 
the minimum of the cumulated residuals. Code as peg if this difference < 
0.04. Occasionally other reference currencies are added (for the same cases 
as BT). 
RANGE-3 As RANGE-4, except at last step code as peg if difference < 0.03. 
RANGE-2 As RANGE-4, except at last step code as peg if difference < 0.02. 
  
RMSE-1 Generate residuals as for RANGE-4. Code as peg if the root mean square 
residual is < 0.01. 
RMSE-0.8 Generate residuals as for RANGE-4. Code as peg if the root mean square 
residual is < 0.008. 
RMSE-0.6 Generate residuals as for RANGE-4. Code as peg if the root mean square 
residual is < 0.006. 
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Appendix Table A2.  Sample of countries (182) 
Developed Countries 
(36)1 
Euro Area (18) 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Rep., Slovenia, Spain; 
Major Advanced Economies (7, 3 of them in Euro Area) 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States;  
Other Advanced Economies (14) 
Australia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Israel, Korea, 
Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland. 
Emerging Market 
Countries (18)2 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey. 
Other Developing 
Countries (128) 
Commonwealth of Independent States (11) 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; 
Asia (19) 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, 
Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam; 
Europe (8) 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia; 
Latin America and the Caribbean (28) 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela; 
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (19) 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; 
Sub-Saharan Africa (43) 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Democratic Rep. of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
